By Valor and Arms

This article was written by Jim Wudarczyk

Although the Union had a superior industrial base, the ability to suddenly arm and properly supply a huge army was a problem that continued to plague the North throughout the war. While the Allegheny Arsenal was instrumental in the fabrication and purchase of ammunition and other ordnance, Pittsburgh’s mills and mines made valuable contributions toward the war effort. However, when the noted PBS series on the Civil War aired its segment on the rise of the industrial cities as a result of the war, it focused on Cincinnati. Yet the record of Pittsburgh’s contribution makes that of Cincinnati pale in comparison. As early as July, 1863, leading British publications hailed Pittsburgh as “the great forge of America.”

Pittsburgh newspapers in September, 1861, boasted of some of the military contracts that were awarded to Pittsburgh firms.

On September 11, 1861, the PITTSBURGH EVENING TELEGRAPH noted, “Four thousand sets of harnesses have been contracted here. Each set will harness a four mule team. About two thousand sets are now ready for delivery and the balance will be put through with the least possible delay.”

The next day, the GAZETTE reported that J. C. Bidwell received a contract for the construction of 54 heavy gun carriages.

Coal mines produced 5,500,000 tons, which was approximately 423,000 tons more than any other four year period.

In the early part of the war, Pittsburgh produced 19,778 blankets, 37,893 articles of clothing, and 675 tents for the Union cause. When volunteer units were in need of uniforms, B. F. Jones donated $3,000 to help outfit the troops, and Pittsburgh citizens raised $13,000 to equip ten companies. This was rather incredible, considering the population of the city and surrounding areas was about 50,000.

Phelps, Parke and Company had the contracts for most of the 871 wagons produced here. Thirty-five ambulances were also built in Pittsburgh.

At the Allegheny Arsenal, millions of cartridges were loaded. It was not uncommon for the warehouses at the Arsenal to hold 8,000,0000 cartridges and 5,000 artillery shells. While the contributions of the Allegheny Arsenal were never properly recognized in the annals of local and national history, this facility shared many of the same problems associated with assisting the war effort.

It should be noted that while the Union army fought bravely, the arms and ordnance used was often lacking in supply and conformity. As early as July 19, 1862, Colonel Charles P. Kingsbury noted that during the Virginia campaign, it was difficult at times to provide proper proportions of ammunitions for the infantry and artillery because of the various calibers used. He also observed that frequently the rifled-muskets failed after a week’s use.

Charles Kingsbury was qualified to make such judgments since he was a graduate of West Point and served since 1840 in various capacities in the Ordnance Department. Not only did he serve as Assistance Ordnance Officer at the arsenals in Watervliet, Fort Monroe, Washington, and Pittsburgh, he also served as commander at Detroit, Little Rock, and the Charleston Arsenals. A veteran of the Mexican War, Kingsbury also had extensive experience in the inspection of artillery in his position as Captain of Ordnance on foundry duty between 1858 and 1861. There is no doubt that his wide experience and exceptional record of service made him very valuable to the Ordnance Department.

Kingsbury proved to be a man of innovation when he suggested that the traditional cartridge box belt used by the army be modified to slip over the shoulder like the ones used by the cavalry. He also suggested that the men be given two cartridge boxes, each capable of holding thirty rounds. In addition, he advanced the idea of using breech-loading rifles.

While in Pittsburgh on January 24, 1863, Kingsbury wrote a letter to Brigadier General S. Williams, in which he reiterated the problems he observed several months before. He wrote, “When the army left Washington two or three kinds of calibers of arms were often found in the same regiment, and in the entire army there were probably not less than ten varieties, and of almost as many calibers, from the manufactories of the United States, England, France, Belgium, Prussia, and Austria.”

On one occasion, Kingsbury apparently criticized Colonel John Symington, commander of the Allegheny Arsenal, for not providing proper articles for field carriages to Captain Howe and General McClellan. In a letter of June 12, 1861, Symington fired a sharp letter to Kingsbury in which he argued that the equipment matched the requisition and was in accordance with the Ordnance Department manual.

Symington wrote, “In conclusion Captain Kingsbury permit me to remark that a more courteous style of writing on your part would be more acceptable. The tone of your letter is rather that of demanding explanations from one found to account to you than the usual official address amongst officers.”

Dean Thomas, in his monumental task of tracing the triumphs and failures of the arsenal system, quotes a letter from Major Robert H. K. Whiteley, dated February 23, 1863, “The capacity of two presses at this Arsenal is to produce 40,000 bullets per diem . . .which is about one-fourth of the quantity consumed daily.” But he continued, “The manufacture of small arm cartridges must stop for want of storeroom shortly unless relieved by issue. I have eight million at this moment stored in a leaky frame shed, by no means safe from accident by fire.”

Thomas also resurrected two incidents of poor quality at the Allegheny Arsenal. However, he notes that inferior quality was an exception to the rule, and as the text noted, sometimes there was an explanation for the complaint. When Lieutenant Colonel G. D. Ramsay, the commander of the Washington Arsenal, complained that the ball of the Enfield cartridge received from Pittsburgh was too large, Symington responded, “. . . For the Enfield rifle a sample gun of inferior quality, was sent here from the State of Ohio, by which to make the cartridge.”

On another occasion, in May of 1862, the 16th Ohio complained that “many of the Cartridges were entirely destitute of Powder and many others were only partially filled.” Symington argued that state arsenals probably reused some of the cartridge boxes since pasteboard was not used for cartridge paper at the Allegheny Arsenal.

The problem of supplying the troops with arms and other equipment was an on-going affair. While the DAILY PITTSBURGH GAZETTE of October 3, 1861, criticized Colonel Symington for the dismissal of 200 boys at the Allegheny Arsenal, Symington’s letter of October 2, 1861, to General Ripley in Washington, D.C., explained his actions in full detail. “I regret at this time when it is so important to push forward the laboratory operations, to have to inform you of a delay in them arising from too serious a cause to admit of being postponed. Some weeks since, matches were discovered among the bundles of cartridges prepared to be packed, in one of the rooms. The strictest investigation failed to detect the offender. Stringent measures were then resorted to and the boys searched on going to work, and leaving, which is still continues. The offense has., however, since repeated in the same room. And as the perpetuators could not be discovered, all the boys employed in the room, over twenty in number, were on each occasion, discharged, and have not been re-employed. It was hoped, as some two weeks passed since the last occurrence, that the malicious spirit has quelled, but yesterday, a similar attempt at mischief was discovered in the same room. That the offender did not belong to the room, is thus made evident and I have discharged all the boys at work in that portion of the laboratory, and will supply their places with females. This must produce some delay but I am assured from the number of applicants for that kind of work, it will only continue for two or three days while they are acquiring the requisite skill.”

While Symington was active in keeping up the Lawrenceville arsenal both prior to and during the Civil War, he was not popular in the neighborhood as an article from THE DAILY PITTSBURGH GAZETTE of October 3, 1861, indicated:

“Considerable excitement existed in Lawrenceville during Wednesday, in consequence of the discharge of two hundred boys in the United States Arsenal in making cartridges, etc. It would appear that during the past few months, matches have been found no less that three times, in rooms where these boys were employed, and extravagant rumors have been circulated in regard to attempts to blow up the magazine, etc. Some of the people residing near the Arsenal were so apprehensive, under the excitement of these rumors, that they feared to lie down at night, lest they be blown to fragments before morning. The first and second scare passed off without any other notice than the gossip of the village and a ‘sensation’ item in one of the newspapers. The third discovery of matches, however, if we are correctly informed, has induced the commander of the Arsenal, Major Symington to discharge all of the boys heretofore employed in the place, numbering about two hundred. As the work at which these lads were engaged is indispensable under existing conditions, their places are being filled by girls as rapidly as possible. What benefit is likely to result from this change we are at a loss to determine, and there are persons at the village who pronounce the act a wanton display of arbitrary power. So many boys, thrown out of work at the approach of winter, must cause no little provocation, although it will be a measure lessened by the opportunity afforded to the girls, however, questionable the change may be in a moral and social point of view.”

Apparently the problem of conformity of arms also surfaced with the ordnance issued to the Home Guards. As the PITTSBURGH POST of May 4, 1861, reported, “The arms at City Hall obtained from the United States Arsenal, for the purpose of arming the Home Guards of the two cities and vicinity, have been arranged and allotted for the several companies, and are being distributed as fast as the bonds for their safe keeping and prompt return are being signed. Nearly all, if not all the companies in the several wards of the two cities are receiving rifles. Those outside the cities, with one or two exceptions, will be issued muskets. The conditions are such that the arms must be kept in the very best order, and returned on twelve hours notice, whenever called for.”

At the beginning of the Civil War, the U.S. army stood at 12,000 men. Lincoln’s call for 75,000 90-day volunteers and later for 300,000 3-year volunteers put a tremendous strain on the ordnance department’s ability to arm so many men. In an attempt to alleviate the arms problem, the military secured 25,000 (13,000 new and 12,000 used) Consol muskets. While the gun fired the standard U. S. Army .69 caliber round, a major flaw in the weapon was that it depended upon a cumbersome “tube-lock” priming system. While it may be argued that any gun was superior to no gun, the Consol musket was despised by the troops.

Robert Collins Suhr, in the March, 2001, issue of AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR, wrote an excellent article on the problems associated with the Consol musket. According to Suhr, “The Consols arrived without the primer tubes, and Fremont immediately arranged for two boxes of the critical primers to be shipped to Saint Louis. Near Pittsburgh, workers mishandled the cases. The fragile, volatile items exploded, killing several men and delaying use of the long arms.”

During the course of the war, the government purchased 7,731 cannons, mortars and columbiads. Of this total, the Fort Pitt Foundry produced 1,193 guns, or 15% of the artillery purchased during the war. Of the artillery produced at Fort Pitt Foundry, most of the guns were 8, 10, and 12 inch siege mortars, 4 ½ inch rifled cannon, 8 and 10 inch howitzers, 8, 10, 12, 15 inch columbiads, and, of course, the famous 20 inch Rodman. The 20-inch Rodman gun was cast on February 12, 1864, and was the largest cannon in the world to be cast. At a cost of $32,000, the gun required 80 tons of molten iron and fired a 1,000 pound ball from a 750 pound shell, charged with 100 pounds of powder.

In addition to casting cannon, Fort Pitt Foundry also produced 194,071 cannon balls, shells and projectiles, valued at nearly $205,000. The top producer of projectiles, however, was Smith, Park and Company, which manufactured 306,965 projectiles, valued at almost $181,000. Other Pittsburgh firms that engaged in the production of projectiles were Anderson and Phillips; Pennock, Hart & Co.; J. C. Bidwell; Pennock and Totten; and Joseph Pennock. In the last two years of the war, Pittsburgh firms produced 10% of all the projectiles used by the Union.

In addition to supplying the army, the city was also instrumental in helping to build a Union navy.

Secretary of War Edwin Stanton was willing to try anything to control the Mississippi River and cut the Confederacy in half. Thus, when he heard of Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr.’s seemingly absurd idea of using the old fashion principle of ramming to destroy rebel ironclads, Stanton cut through all the bureaucratic red tape and gave Ellet the opportunity to test his theory.

Ellet, a brilliant engineer, was dispatched on March 27, 1862, to Pittsburgh where he purchased five of the nine boats that would constitute his fleet. These were the Lioness, Sampson and Mingo, which were described as “three powerful Ohio river stern-wheel towboats.” The other two boats, the Fulton and Homer, were “two small stern-wheel tow boats, as tender and dispatch for the fleet.” Two of the larger boats were worn out coal towboats but Ellet believed they would serve his purpose since they capable of making 18 or 20 miles an hour down the Mississippi. Therefore, he wasted no time in strengthening their hulls with heavy timbers and raising bulkheads of timber around the boilers.

Since labor was scarce in Pittsburgh, Ellet purchased the additional four boats further down river. Ellet’s personal magnetism was responsible for luring men to man the ships.

Ellet’s ships joined the Union fleet and on July 5, 1862, his theory was put to the test at the battle of Memphis. With only four Union casualties, Ellet’s ram fleet destroyed seven Confederate gunboats. While Ellet proved the value of his ram boats, he was one of the casualties. He thought the wound to his knee was slight. However, the wound failed to heal and two weeks later he died.

Pittsburgh also produced ironclad ships. In 1861 a contract was awarded to the firm of Mason and Snowden to construct a “Monitor-type boat.” Christened the “Manayunk,” this vessel was not launched until December 18, 1864, and was completed at a cost of $583,000. This vessel was 33 feet wide and 224 feet long, and was believed to be safe enough to sail around the world. It was armed with two 15-inch guns.

Mason and Snowden also received the contract to build the “Umpqua” in 1863, although it was not completed until 1864 at a cost of $595,652.66. This vessel had a revolving turret and was built for river service.

Another Pittsburgh firm, Hartupee and Tomlinson, was contracted in 1862 to build two smaller ironclads: the Marietta and Sandusky, which were completed at a cost of $470,179.14.

The iron mills of the city also contributed deck plating and iron armor to cover ships being constructed in Philadelphia and New York. The demand for iron was so great that by 1863 a number of new iron mills were constructed for the purpose of rolling armor plate for naval use.

Pittsburgh also helped to provide crews to man the ships. In one interesting twist of fate, Captain Robert Greenlee left his prosperous tugboat business in New Orleans to offer his services to the Union. He left his sons, Lewis Shrodes Greenlee and Charles Wesley Greenlee, in charge of the business.

At the battle of Vicksburg, Captain Greenlee carried Union troops past the Confederate batteries. At one point, the windows in the pilot’s house were shattered by gunfire. Although he escaped injury, what Greenlee did not know was that the Confederates firing at him were his own two sons. Lewis achieved quite a reputation as a spy and was believed to have been responsible for setting fire to boats at the Saint Louis wharf.

Although the family was reconciled after the war, neither Greenlee nor his sons had any regrets about fighting for the side they chose.

Sources

Louis Vaira, “Some Aspects of Pittsburgh’s Industrial Contribution to the Civil War,” WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL MAGAZINE, Volume 6, January, 1922.

Letter from Colonel John Symington to General Ripley, October 2, 1861.

THE DAILY PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, October 3, 1861.

THE PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Sunday Magazine: “Sons Fought Father in River Warfare,” April 9, 1961, p. 23

Sarah H. Killikelly, THE HISTORY OF PITTSBURGH: IT’S RISE AND PROGRESS, Pittsburgh: B. C. and Gordon Montgomery Company, 1906.

Robert Collins Suhr, “Consol Musket,” AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR, March, 2001.

George Swetnam, PITTSYLVANIA COUNTRY, (New York: Duell, Sloan, Pearce, 1951.)

Letter from Colonel John Symington to Colonel Charles P. Kingsbury, June 12, 1861.

Robert C. Totten, “Fort Pitt Cannon Foundry: Totten Personal Account,” WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL MAGAZINE, Volume III, 1920.

Dean S. Thomas, ROUND BALL TO RIM FIRE: A HISTORY O CIVIL WR SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, PART ONE, (Gettysburg: Thomas Publications, 1997).

“Charles P. Kingsbury,” Corpus Christi Public Libraries, 2002, http://www.library.ci.corpus-christi.tx.us/MexicanWar/kingsburycp.htm